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Semantic Incommensurability
and Empirical Comparability:
The Case of Lorentz and Einstein
Martin Carrier
University of Bielefeld
Résumé : L’incommensurabilité sémantique est comprise comme la non-
traduisibilité de concepts appartenant à différentes théories. L’objectif de l’ar-
ticle est de proposer une reconstruction rationnelle de la notion d’incommen-
surabilité qui sous-tend les écrits de Feyerabend et du dernier Kuhn. L’incom-
mensurabilité, prétend-on, peut être reconstruite sur cette base en tant que
notion cohérente, et des exemples pertinents peuvent en être donnés. L’impos-
sibilité de la traduction entre concepts incommensurables provient de l’impos-
sibilité de satisfaire conjointement deux conditions d’adéquation que la théorie
contextuelle de la signification impose aux traductions. Les analogues concep-
tuels potentiels s’avèrent, soit ne pas préserver les conditions d’application, soit
ne pas reproduire les relations inférentielles pertinentes. L’incommensurabilité
est ainsi construite comme le résultat d’un type particulier de relations concep-
tuelles produit par l’incompatibilité des théories correspondantes. Ces relations
conceptuelles sont suffisamment étroites pour rendre possible une comparaison
empirique des assertions théoriques pertinentes. L’article s’efforce de rendre
ces thèses plausibles en développant des exemples tirés de l’électrodynamique
classique et de la relativité spéciale.
Abstract: Semantic incommensurability is understood as non-translatability
of concepts taken from different theories. My aim is to give a rational re-
construction of the notion of incommensurability underlying the writings of
Philosophia Scientiæ, 8 (1), 2004, 73–94.
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Feyerabend and the later Kuhn. I claim that incommensurability can be re-
constructed on this basis as a coherent conception and that relevant instances
can be identified. The translation failure between incommensurable concepts
arises from the impossibility to jointly fulfil two conditions of adequacy that
the context theory of meaning places on translations. Potential conceptual
analogues either fail to preserve the conditions of application or to reproduce
the relevant inferential relations. Incommensurability is thus construed as
the result of a particular type of conceptual relations which is produced by
the incompatibility of the pertinent theories. These conceptual relations are
sufficiently tight to make an empirical comparison of the relevant theoreti-
cal assertions possible. I try to make these claims plausible by elaborating
examples from classical electrodynamics and special relativity.
1. Introduction
Incommensurability is among the catchwords of later 20th century phi-
losophy of science. The notion of incommensurability in the non-geo-
metrical sense relevant here was simultaneously introduced by Thomas
S. Kuhn and Paul K. Feyerabend in 1962 [Kuhn 1962, 103], [Feyer-
abend 1962, 58]. Kuhn conceived of incommensurability as arising from
a deep-reaching conflict between paradigms or comprehensive theoretical
traditions, a conflict supposedly transcending mere incompatibility. The
adoption of a new paradigm entails the restructuring, as it were, of the
relevant universe of discourse; the adherents of the two paradigms tend
to talk past one another. In particular, incommensurability is intended
to express that, first, disparate concepts are employed in each of the the-
ories at hand, second, distinct problems are tackled, third, the suggested
problem solutions are evaluated according to different standards, and,
finally, perceptions are structured differently [Kuhn 1962, 103-110, 148-
150]. Feyerabend, by contrast, focused on the “inexplicability”, that is,
the non-translatability of a term taken from one theory into the concep-
tual framework of another one incompatible with the first [Feyerabend
1962, 52-62].
While the initial use of the term “incommensurability” varied signifi-
cantly, it came to be restricted, subsequently, to two features. “Method-
ological incommensurability” was intended to express the claimed inde-
terminacy of judgment as to the comparative merits of different theo-
retical approaches. “Semantic incommensurability” was supposed to de-
note the non-translatability of statements from incompatible, strongly
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contrasting theories. In the following, I exclusively address this second
notion of semantic incommensurability. This notion agrees with the one
entertained by Feyerabend and the later Kuhn. My aim is to give a
systematic reconstruction of the nature and impact of semantic incom-
mensurability.
Underlying the conception of incommensurability is the theoretical
context account of meaning which both authors adopted for explaining
the meaning of scientific terms in general. I try to show, first, that in-
commensurability can be reconstructed coherently on the basis of the
context account. I present incommensurability as a consequence of this
semantic theory along with the historical observation that substantial
theoretical revisions occur indeed. My conclusion is that incommensu-
rability qualifies as a sensible notion. Second, I defend the coherence
of the notion of incommensurability by offering relevant examples. My
chief case concerns the non-translatability of concepts of Lorentzian elec-
trodynamics and Einsteinian special relativity theory. This presentation
is intended to buttress the claim that incommensurability is real and in-
stantiated. Third, I explore the impact of incommensurability on empir-
ical comparability. Incommensurability was perceived as a major threat
to the possibility of rational theory evaluation. My aim is to dispel such
worries. Incommensurable theories allow empirical comparison. The
argument proceeds on the basis of the semantic principles adopted by
Kuhn and Feyerabend. That is, given their own linguistic approach, in-
commensurability does not result in a breakdown of comparing empirical
achievements of the theories in question. Empirical comparison does not
require translation and remains largely unaffected by incommensurabil-
ity.
2. Meaning, Theoretical Context, and Adequate Trans-
lation
Kuhn and Feyerabend accept the context theory of meaning. According
to this account, the meaning of a concept is determined by its relations
to other concepts and the meaning of a statement results from its inte-
gration in a network of other statements. Another way of putting this
is to say that the use of a concept determines its meaning. What a
concept means is represented by the way in which it is applied to dif-
ferent situations. The use of scientific concepts is specified by the laws
of nature in which these concepts figure. The meaning of a concept like
“electric field” is given by its lawful connections to related concepts such
as electric current, charge or magnetic field. The concept “electric field”
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is understood if it is known, for instance, that such fields are produced by
electric currents or variable magnetic fields and generate changes in the
motion of charges, and so forth. Laws and theories supply a concept with
a network of relations to other concepts, and this network determines to
which situations the concept is properly applied. Such generalizations
add to the meaning of the relevant concepts1.
Translation in the sense relevant here concerns concepts of different
theories. Translation requires the coordination of a linguistic item with
another one taken from a different theoretical framework but possessing
the same meaning. The understanding underlying the entire discussion
of the incommensurability thesis is that translation needs to be precise
(clumsy paraphrases don’t suffice) and provide a one-to-one correlation
between expressions. The latter condition does not demand that one
word is assigned to exactly one word; rather, coordinating strings of
words with one another is quite legitimate. The issue is not about words
but about semantic resources. It is not about terminology but about
what can be expressed within a conceptual framework [Sankey 1994,
76-77].
On the basis of the context theory, the requirement of meaning preser-
vation is to be interpreted as unchanged use. This notion of use compre-
hends two features which should both be retained in translation. First,
theoretical integration should coincide for the two items at issue. This
applies, in particular, to the reproduction of standing inferential rela-
tions among predicates or the statements formed by them. After all,
it is such relations that provide the context relevant to the ascription
of meaning. For example, the sentence “the tree over there is losing its
foliage” implies: “there is a deciduous tree”. Analogously, “Wilfried is a
bachelor” entails “Wilfried is not divorced”. The network of such rela-
tions supplies predicates with their content; consequently, these relations
should be preserved among supposedly synonymous expressions. Second,
the conditions of application of concepts should remain unaltered. One
of the reasons why the French predicate “x roule en deux chevaux” is
disqualified as a translation of “x loves cats” is that their conditions of
application exhibit hardly any correlation. The two predicates are only
accidentally applied to the same objects; they differ in meaning for this
reason. Synonymous concepts should refer to the same states of affairs.
On the whole, then, the theoretical context account recognizes two
chief determinants of the meaning of concepts. First, the inferential inte-
1[Kuhn 1983a, 576-577], [Kuhn 1987, 8], [Kuhn 1989, 12, 15-20]; see also [Irzik &
Grünberg 1995, 297-298], [Feyerabend 1962, 76-81], [Feyerabend 1965c, 180]; see also
[Papineau 1979, 36-45], [Sankey 1994a, 6-10].
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gration of a concept which is specified by its relations to other concepts.
The integration of scientific concepts, in particular, is provided, among
other things, by the relevant laws or theories. Second, the conditions
of application which are determined by the set of situations to which a
concept is thought to apply (or not to apply, respectively). To these two
sources of meaning correspond two constraints on adequate translations.
Rendering a concept appropriately demands, first, the preservation of
the relevant inferential relations, and, second, the retention of the con-
ditions of application [Carrier 2001, section 4].
One of Kuhn’s most prominent historical claims is that science pro-
ceeds at least sometimes through stages of significant and deep-reaching
conceptual and theoretical alteration. There is drastic theoretical change
in science. This view finds its most prominent expression in Kuhn’s
characterization of scientific revolutions. Kuhnian revolutions are con-
ceived as non-cumulative transitions. They do not involve the sustained
elaboration of an accepted conceptual framework. On the contrary, a
scientific revolution à la Kuhn consists in the revocation of fundamental
principles of a discipline and their replacement by disparate ones. Fur-
thermore, the disparity between pre- and post-revolutionary principles
prohibits any smooth integration of the former into the framework of
the latter. As a result of the far-reaching divergence between them, the
pre-revolutionary theory cannot be reconstructed as the limiting case of
the post-revolutionary one [Kuhn 1962, Chapters VIII-X].
Kuhn initially located the chief origin of theoretical disagreement
in revolutionary periods in perceptual, methodological, and ontological
changes, but later distinguished linguistic deviation as the crucial fea-
ture of scientific revolutions. Incommensurability or non-translatability
is shifted to center stage [Kuhn 1983, 684], [Kuhn 1987, 19-20]. A the-
ory is thought to comprise a series of terms that are supposed to denote
natural kinds. Such kind-terms indicate what is assumed to be of the
same kind within the theoretical framework. Kind-terms represent ac-
cepted similarity relations among objects or processes. Incommensura-
bility is said to arise from the non-translatability of kind-terms which
is attributed, in turn, to divergent judgments about similarity relations
[Kuhn 1993, 315-318; 328; 336], [Irzik & Grünberg 1998, 211-212].
I wish to address Kuhnian relations of sameness in kind indirectly by
examining first the relations among seemingly analogous concepts from
theories separated by a scientific revolution and by exploring the options
for giving adequate translations. Kuhn recognizes that the kind-terms
of a theory are connected to the laws of this theory [Kuhn 1987, 20],
[Kuhn 1993, 316-317]. I will deal with conceptual relations first and come
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back to sameness in kind later. An often quoted instance of a Kuhnian
revolution is the Einsteinian Revolution, a part of which involved the
substitution of Hendrik Lorentz’s classical electrodynamics by Albert
Einstein’s special relativity theory. This is a revolutionary change by
any measure so that the emergence of incommensurable concepts can be
expected — provided that incommensurability is instantiated at all. I
begin by giving a brief sketch of the relevant theories.
3. Shifting Theoretical Ground: The Example of the
Einsteinian Revolution
One of the characteristics of Lorentz’s electrodynamic theory was the
assumption of an immovable ether. The ether was held to be at absolute
rest; it is not displaced through the motion of charged bodies. But such
motions produce changes in the state of the ether, and these changes
propagate through the ether with the velocity of light. The ether medi-
ates in this way the interaction between charged objects. True motion is
motion with respect to the ether. The equations of electrodynamics were
restricted to frames at rest in the ether; they were thought not to hold
for moving systems without adaptation. For instance, the velocity of
light, as it features in Maxwell’s equations, was construed as its velocity
relative to the ether. The measured value of this velocity should depend
on the motion of the observer. However, no such dependence was found
empirically. After Michelson and Morley had shown with high numerical
precision in 1887 that no effect of the Earth’s motion on the velocity of
light was detectable, Lorentz (following Fitzgerald) introduced his con-
traction hypothesis. The length of a moved body in the direction of
motion shrinks to such a degree that the change in the velocity of light
induced by the motion is precisely compensated — as the Michelson-
Morley null result demands. This length reduction is produced by the
interaction between moved matter and the ether. The resting ether com-
presses the body in passage through it, and this contraction precisely
compensates the effect of the motion on the measurement of electromag-
netic quantities. As a result of this double influence, no effect of the
motion on the moved body will be registered2.
Lorentz succeeded in deriving the contraction hypothesis from the
principles of his theory by drawing on the additional assumption that
the intermolecular forces that were supposed to hold a body together
2[Lorentz 1899, 268-270], [Drude 1900, 482], [McCormmach 1970, 47-48], [Nerses-
sian 1986, 224], [Schaffner 1972, 113]; see [Carrier 2002, section 3].
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and were thus responsible for the body’s dimensions transform like elec-
tromagnetic forces. This assumption is made plausible by the notion
that these intermolecular forces are similar in kind to electromagnetic
forces or even of the same nature. Lorentz did not rule out the exis-
tence of tangible effects of the motion of bodies through the ether. Only
“many” electromagnetic phenomena were thought to appear in the same
way irrespective of the observer’s state of motion [Schaffner 1974, 48].
In addition, Lorentz’s theory entailed that the frame of reference at rest
in the ether was distinguished among the class of inertial frames in that
it alone yields the true measures of lengths and velocities. The motion
through the ether distorts spatiotemporal quantities. An optics textbook
of the period put it this way:
Another way of explaining the negative results of Michelson’s experiment
has been proposed by Lorentz and Fitzgerald. These men assume that the
length of a solid body depends upon its absolute motion in space. [Drude
1900, 481].
On the other hand, the motion produces further effects that precisely
offset the initial distortion — at least in “many” relevant phenomena.
Lorentz’s account involves a sort of conspiracy among different factors
brought forth by the motion of charged bodies. These factors are so
contrived as to cancel each other out, concealing in this way the true
motion of bodies from the unbefitting curiosity of human observers.
While it is true that Einstein worked out his special theory of rela-
tivity within the electrodynamic program and as a revision of Lorentz’s
theory [McCormmach 1970, 74], [Darrigol 1996, 242-243], full-fledged
special relativity is conceptually distinct from Lorentz’s account. There
is historical continuity, to be sure, but the end-product of Einstein’s
struggle with classical electrodynamics was markedly different from its
Lorentzian ancestor. In spite of their common origin and their close his-
torical ties, the conceptual resources invoked in both accounts exhibit
semantic incommensurability.
In contradistinction to Lorentzian electrodynamcis, Einstein’s rela-
tivity theory proceeds from the so-called special principle of relativity
which says that all inertial frames of reference are equivalent in every
physical respect. As a part of classical mechanics, this principle had
long been accepted. But the version suggested by Einstein was sup-
posed to include electrodynamic processes; it implied that there is no
privileged rest frame for electromagnetic phenomena. It follows that
there are no absolute velocities; all velocities are relative to other bodies
or frames of reference. The second axiom Einstein cites is the constancy
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of the velocity of light which says that the velocity of light is indepen-
dent of the velocity of the light source. This constancy axiom follows
from Maxwell’s theory; it is a theorem of pre-relativistic electrodynam-
ics. The special principle and the constancy axiom together imply the
invariance of the velocity of light according to which this velocity assumes
the same value for all inertially moved observers. The special principle of
relativity entails that the inertial motion of a system of charged bodies
or of an observer has no impact on electromagnetic processes. That is,
Einstein abolished both the distorting influence of the motion and the
counteracting factor. According to special relativity, all inertial frames
are equivalent right from the start; their equivalence does not require
the action of a compensating mechanism.
Special relativity likewise entails a contraction of moved bodies. In
fact, Einstein’s formula precisely agrees with Lorentz’s; both give the
same ratio of length reduction for a moved body. But in spite of their
mathematical identity, the Lorentzian and Einsteinian equations differ
in meaning. Their semantic difference is rooted in the divergent under-
standing of “velocity” in both sets of equations. For Lorentz it means
“absolute velocity”, that is, velocity of the relevant body with respect
to the ether rest frame. But for Einstein there is no such rest frame.
The velocity in question is rather the relative velocity between body and
observer.
This contrasting understanding has important ramifications. Con-
sider a body and an observer moved at different speeds and assume
that the observer registers a contraction of the body’s dimensions. It
follows from Lorentzian electrodynamics that viewed from the angle of
the moved and seemingly shortened body, the observer should appear
expanded. After all, the moved body is compressed by the passage
through the ether, and any length measurement using such shortened
rods as standard should create the impression of expanded bodies. But
on the basis of the principle of relativity, no states of absolute motion
are admitted. Relative velocity is all that counts. Consequently, judged
from Einstein’s perspective, the observer should appear contracted as
well. All that can be said is that the two bodies are in relative motion
so that they are both subject to length contraction. This means that
Lorentz-contraction proper is asymmetric whereas Einstein-contraction
is reciprocal. These considerations suggest the existence of significant
conceptual discrepancies behind the superficial, specious identity of the
formulas. I take a closer look at the relevant conceptual relations in the
following section.
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4. Incommensurable Quantities in Classical Electro-
dynamics and Special Relativity
The challenge is to give appropriate translations for Lorentzian concepts
in terms of special relativity and vice versa. The spatiotemporal and
dynamic measures in each theory constitute candidates for translation.
Thus, the issue is whether counterparts for concepts like length, duration,
velocity, and mass can be specified in the two theories at hand. I leave
temporal quantities out of consideration. The reason is that Lorentz
retained universal time but later learned from Einstein that it is his local
time, rather than universal time, that the clock readings provide. Even
after this recognition, however, Lorentz endeavored to stick to universal
time and never reached a clear position in this matter. Unlike time
dilation, Lorentz clearly endorsed length contraction and his pertinent
formula agrees mathematically with Einstein’s.
The issue, then, is translation. As I argued earlier, in light of the
theoretical context account, a translation has to preserve the application
conditions and the inferential relations of a term (see section 2). Let’s
see how prima-facie translations fare in light of these requirements.
The first attempt is to focus on conditions of application and to
translate according to equality of measuring procedures: quantities that
are determined empirically in the same way can be translated into one
another. I won’t go into the details and simply state that length mea-
surements based on rod transport or transmission time of light signals are
equally accepted within both theories. That is, classical electrodynamics
and special relativity roughly agree on the acceptability of length mea-
surements. Measuring lengths by registering the round-trip travel time
of a light signal, as it is done, for instance, in a Michelson-Morley setup
is endorsed within the two accounts, and the results of the procedure
are unanimously acknowledged as reliable. For Lorentz, the velocity of
light would be altered by a possible motion of the observer, to be sure,
but since the traversed spaces would change as well, the length ratios
measured are trustworthy in any event. For Einstein, both the distor-
tion and the counteraction are missing so that the procedure operates
reliably anyway.
However, the inferential relations fail to be retained. The crucial
divergence concerns the interpretation of the relevant velocities. In
Lorentz’s contraction formula the significant quantity is the velocity be-
tween the moved body and the ether; in Einstein’s mathematically iden-
tical equation the important magnitude is the velocity between the body
and an observer. The disparate conceptual integration of the seemingly
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identical concepts of length and velocity becomes conspicuous once the
relevant types of situation, as they emerge in the Lorentzian framework,
are reconsidered in Einsteinian terms.
(1) Lorentzian situation: body and observer are equally at rest in the
ether: no contraction.
Einsteinian reconsideration: body and observer are at relative rest:
no contraction.
(2) Lorentzian situation: the body is in absolute motion, the observer
is at rest in the ether: contraction of the body.
Einsteinian reconsideration: body and observer are in relative mo-
tion: reciprocal contraction.
(3) Lorentzian situation: the observer is in absolute motion, body is at
rest in the ether: contraction of the observer issuing in an apparent
spatial dilation of the body.
Einsteinian reconsideration: body and observer are in relative mo-
tion: reciprocal contraction.
(4) Lorentzian situation: both body and observer are in equal absolute
motion: shrinkage of both body and observer but no net effect due
to compensation (Michelson-Morley situation).
Einsteinian reconsideration: body and observer at relative rest: no
contraction.
The Lorentzian and Einsteinian approaches differ in judgment as to
whether or not contraction occurs in a particular type of situation.
Items (2) and (3) bring out the contrast between asymmetric Lorentz-
contraction proper and reciprocal Einstein-contraction. If a moved body
appears contracted to an observer, it is the observer which moves as
viewed from the perspective of the seemingly shortened body. The rela-
tivity principles entail that the observer appears contracted, he does not
look stretched. This is different for Lorentz-contraction. Consider an
observer moved with respect to the ether who measures the dimensions
of a body at rest in the ether. In this situation, the observer’s exten-
sion is reduced so that he will register an increased length of the body.
The body appears enlarged, not contracted. Regarding item (4), when
an observer is moved along with a body so that the two are at relative
rest, Lorentz contraction occurs, to be sure, but remains hidden because
of an equal contraction of the measuring rods. By contrast, Einstein
contraction is entirely absent under such circumstances.
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Such differences in judgment indicate a change in the theoretical in-
tegration of the concept of length. Consider a case of curvilinear (but
approximately rectilinear) motion such as the annual revolution of the
Earth around the Sun. In Lorentzian terms, the change in the direc-
tion of motion entails that the body cannot be at rest in the ether all
the time. This implies that contraction occurs. In special relativity, by
contrast, this inferential tie is severed. The occurrence of a change of
motion entails nothing as to contraction. All depends on the choice of
the frame of reference. Conversely, whereas in special relativity the in-
troduction of such a frame in a particular state of motion is sufficient for
implying judgments as to the occurrence of contraction, no such unam-
biguous consequences ensue from classical electrodynamics. In the latter
framework absolute velocities are needed for making clear assessments
possible so that the relativistic connection between relative motion and
contraction is lost. I conclude that characteristic inferential relations for
the concept of length are different in the two theories.
This first approach invoked sameness of measuring procedures as the
basis for translation and involved the rule to retain as far as possible
the conditions of application of the relevant terms. On this basis the
electrodynamic concept of length appears roughly synonymous to the
relativistic one. However, this translation rule fails to reproduce the
relevant inferential relations. It falls short of underwriting adequate
translations for this reason.
The second attempt is directed at the preservation of these inferen-
tial relations. The pursuit of this line of thought amounts to explicating
the terms “velocity” and “contraction” by delineating the role they play
in classical electrodynamics or special relativity, respectively. Adopting
the relativistic point of view, one could say that Lorentzian velocities are
no relative velocities but refer to the motion of a body with respect to
the ether, and one could add that these absolute velocities are allegedly
responsible for length contraction phenomena. However, adopting such
a translation rule drastically changes the conditions of application of
the translated concepts. According to special relativity, there is no such
thing as absolute velocity or as ether-caused contraction (let alone the
converse spatial dilation). If the Lorentzian concepts of velocity and
length reduction are simply grafted upon relativity theory, these con-
cepts become empty. They are no longer legitimately applied to any
phenomenon. The retention of the inferential relations is purchased at
the expense of losing the conditions of application. This second approach
also fails to provide an appropriate translation for this reason.
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The relationship between electromagnetic and relativistic mass con-
stitutes a second, analogous example. According to the so-called elec-
tromagnetic mass concept, the inertial properties of bodies arise at least
partially from the interaction between charges and fields. In this vein,
Lorentz distinguishes between “real” and “total” mass. Real mass is of
mechanical origin and invariantly characterizes a given body. Total mass
is real mass together with a variable increase in the inertia of a charged
body in motion as a result of its interaction with the ether [Miller 1981,
46-47]. Total mass governs the dynamic behavior of a body. Analogously,
special relativity introduces rest mass and relativistic mass. Rest mass,
like real mass, is an invariant characteristic of a body. Relativistic mass
comprehends rest mass and a variable increase in inertia as a result of the
relative motion of a body. Relativistic mass, like total mass, determines
the dynamic behavior of a body. Further, the dependence of relativistic
mass on rest mass and velocity is mathematically identical to the de-
pendence of total mass on real mass and velocity. In addition, mass is
evaluated in the same way in the two accounts in question. They both
endorse determining mass values using a balance or collision processes
(thereby drawing on momentum conservation). Therefore, the theoreti-
cal integration of the Lorentzian and Einsteinian mass concepts coincide
in some respect and the conditions of application agree, too. Accord-
ingly, it appears that Lorentz’s “total mass” and Einstein’s “relativistic
mass” are corresponding quantities, and that Lorentz’s “real mass” and
Einstein’s “rest mass” are conceptually analogous as well.
However, there are other features of the theoretical integration of
these concepts of mass that differ considerably. Lorentz’s real mass is
assumed to become manifest when the relevant body is at rest with re-
spect to the ether. Einstein’s rest mass, by contrast, is obtained by an
observer at rest relative to the body. Analogously, the value of total mass
is supposed to be determined by the velocity of the body with respect
to the ether, while the value of relativistic mass is assumed to depend
on the difference between the velocities of body and observer. Consider
a charged body which is moved through the ether at the same speed
as an observer. The electrodynamic judgment is that the mass of the
body departs from its real value. It does so for all observers, and conse-
quently also for the observer moved with the body. In relativity theory,
by contrast, relative motion is all that matters, so that an observer at
relative rest measures the body’s rest mass. Electrodynamics draws on
total mass for capturing this situation, special relativity takes rest mass
to be the relevant quantity. Conversely, consider a body at rest in the
ether as viewed from a moved observer. From the electrodynamic point
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of view, the dynamic behavior of the body is governed by its real mass
whereas special relativity assumes that relativistic mass is the relevant
magnitude.
Underlying such differences in judgment is the divergent nomological
integration of the mass concepts (which is veiled by the mathematical
indistinguishability of the pertinent formulas). This divergence concerns
the conception of the relevant velocities. Lorentzian electrodynamics
takes the velocity between body and ether as the crucial parameter;
Einsteinian special relativity assumes the velocity between body and ob-
server to be of critical importance. As a result of this discrepancy in
the nomological integration, the inferential relations between the mass
concepts and other theoretical magnitudes disagree. For instance, the
information that body and observer are in relative motion makes it im-
possible to employ the concept of rest mass in order to account for the
situation. Within a Lorentzian framework, nothing of this sort follows.
In particular, it is not ruled out to invoke the supposedly analogous con-
cept of real mass. Namely, the body might be at rest and the observer
in motion. The Einsteinian inferential bond is missing in Lorentz.
This consideration shows that these allegedly intertranslatable con-
cepts are used differently. Actually, the semantic features can be ex-
pressed in analogy to the above-mentioned relations among spatial quan-
tities. The attempt to translate concepts from disparate theories leaves
one with the choice between two equally unacceptable alternatives. The
first one is to translate according to the relevant conditions of applica-
tion. That is, the two terms are applied under the same circumstances.
The catch is that the corresponding predicates do not exhibit the same
inferential relations. In contradistinction to special relativity, classical
electrodynamics does not license any relevant inference to be drawn from
the fact that body and observer are in relative motion. The second op-
tion is to translate such that the inferential relations are retained. This
amounts to giving a description of ether-based electrodynamics. But the
mass concepts specified in this framework are empty from a relativistic
perspective: there is no motion relative to the ether. Thus, the condi-
tions of application fail to be preserved. On the whole, then, the mass
concepts in classical electrodynamics are incommensurable with the mass
concepts in special relativity [Carrier 2002, section 4].
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5. Incommensurability, Split-Up of Natural Kinds
and Shifts in Reference
Kuhn featured shifts in the assumed similarity relations as the primary
characteristic of incommensurability. He claimed that the discrepancy
between the taxonomies of natural kinds is the chief obstacle to trans-
lation [Kuhn 1983a, 683], [Hoyningen-Huene 1989, 211-212]. Such kind-
terms denote classes of entities that are judged to be of the same kind in
light of a theory (see section 3). Incommensurable theories introduce par-
tially overlapping classes of natural kinds. Such theories agree in judg-
ments about the sameness in kind of some of the relevant entities, but
disagree as to the sameness in kind of others. The shift toward a novel
theory, incommensurable with the received one, produces a reshuﬄe of
the classes of natural kinds. Such classes are torn into pieces, and the
debris is reassembled to form novel, disparate classes. What is consid-
ered as being of the same nature before a revolution may be regarded as
different afterward. Conversely, what was thought to be different in kind
may be taken as being alike in the new theory. It follows that two items
which fall under the same category in one account are possibly to be
expressed using different concepts in the other account. And two items
labeled distinctly in one approach might be designated using the same
concept in the other approach. Partial overlap or cross-classification of
this sort vitiates translation and generates incommensurability [Kuhn
1990c, 4], [Irzik & Grünberg 1995, 299].
This cross-over of equivalence relations is manifest in the list of Ein-
steinian reconsiderations of Lorentzian types of situations (see section
4). Ties of similarity are unraveled, and others are established in their
stead. For instance, from a Lorentzian perspective, a body in absolute
motion registered by an observer at rest in the ether (situation-type (2))
is of the same type as a situation in which both body and observer
are in equal absolute motion (the Michelson-Morley situation (4)). The
two situations are equally characterized by a contraction of the body—
although it fails to become manifest if the observer is moved with the
body. From Einstein’s point of view, by contrast, the two situations
are distinct in kind in that relative motion, and consequently contrac-
tion, is only present in the former, but not in the latter. Conversely,
in Einstein’s framework all states of affairs that involve a relative mo-
tion between body and observer are of the same type (situations (2) and
(3)). By contrast, against the backdrop of Lorentz’s theory, it makes a
difference whether the body or the observer is in motion.The observer
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will register a contraction if the body is moved but a dilatation if she is
in motion herself.
This consideration brings to the fore the Kuhnian partial overlap
of kind-terms. In Lorentz, situation-type (4) is considered similar to
situation-type (2), whereas in Einstein, situation-type (3) is taken to
be so related to situation-type (2). The first natural kind is “being in
absolute motion,” the second is “being in relative motion”. Both the
Lorentzian and the Einsteinian kind-terms contain situation-type (2),
but otherwise include different circumstances. This exemplifies that dis-
parate systems of laws can tie different states of affairs together. Con-
flicting theories tend to collect nomologically relevant properties into
incompatible classes of natural kinds.
The same reasoning applies to mass. In the Lorentzian framework,
situations of the same type are characterized by equality of body velocity
with regard to the ether — irrespective of the motion of the observer.
Such Lorentzian kinds are dissolved in relativity theory through the in-
troduction of the motion relative to an observer as the salient quantity.
Conversely, Einstein forged other relations of natural kinds instead. Sit-
uations of the same type are characterized by equal velocity with regard
to an observer — irrespective of the motion relative to the ether. That
is, what was formerly conceptually united crumbled into separate pieces.
And what was considered distinct previously was integrated conceptu-
ally.
Incommensurable concepts emerge if, owing to nomological change,
natural kinds are restructured. If a new system of laws is adopted that
conflicts with a previous one, the former equivalence classes split up into
heterogeneous components and realign to form new taxonomic struc-
tures. This change of the class of properties to which a concept is rightly
applied goes back to a change in the nomological integration of this con-
cept. The use of electrodynamic and relativistic concepts is governed by
contrasting sets of laws. It is this nomological contrast that constitutes
the ultimate reason for the translation failure. The dissolution and the
new formation of natural kinds which is placed at center stage by Kuhn
is a proximate reason that follows from the divergence of the relevant
inferential relations.
88 Martin Carrier
6. Empirical Comparison of Theories with Incommen-
surable Concepts
Meaning discrepancy due to nomological divergence has a wider impact
on the notion of scientific rationality. It affects the understanding of
scientific progress and empirical comparison. Most linguistic theories
accept the principle that meaning determines reference. Given this con-
nection, a change in meaning suggests a shift in reference. Consequently,
incommensurable concepts are likely to differ in reference. Barring the
occurrence of coextensional terms like “rational animal” and “featherless
biped”, theory change goes along with reference change so that the suc-
cessor theory says different things about different objects — rather than
different things about the same objects. This feature would certainly
undermine a cumulative view of scientific progress. Progress could not
be regarded as involving a better understanding of the same entities.
Incommensurability appears to threaten, in addition, the comparabil-
ity of the empirical achievements of rivaling theories. Without a common
referential ground, no overlap among the empirical findings and prob-
lems can be identified — or so it seems. Incommensurability appears to
rule out any agreement as to which problems are to be tackled and which
facts are relevant. Actually, it is not even clear whether the theories at
hand are competing with one another. A competition requires same-
ness of reference; competing theories entail divergent predictions about
the same entities. But in the case of incommensurable theories, as the
argument runs, sameness of reference can never be ascertained.
The line of reasoning leading from translation failure to the exclu-
sion of empirical comparison roughly runs as follows. Non-translatability
implies that the content of one theory cannot be expressed within the
conceptual framework of the other. But if it remains obscure what the
allegedly rival theory says, there is no way to judge if it agrees or conflicts
with the theoretical assumptions under scrutiny. If comparison of con-
tent is ruled out, no comparison of the pertinent empirical consequences
can be accomplished.
In fact, however, empirical comparison remains a live option. Incom-
mensurable theories need to be comparable in some respect in order to
generate a non-trivial translation problem in the first place. A host of
theories is not translatable into one another without anything significant
coming out of it. Lorentzian electrodynamics cannot be expressed us-
ing concepts from Darwin’s theory of natural selection, special relativity
cannot be translated into game theoretical vocabulary. This is a rather
unexciting feature. In order for non-translatability to become a non-
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trivial issue at all, such cases need to be excluded. The obvious way to
do this is to draw on one of the defining features of incommensurability,
namely, incompatibility of the laws involved. Incommensurable concepts
are untranslatable since the relevant laws, as specified within each of the
theories at hand, contradict one another (see section 1). But no such in-
compatibility occurs in anyone of the just-mentioned cases [Feyerabend
1972, 304], [Hoyningen-Huene 1989, 213]3.
But a conflict between two theories only emerges if there is some
shared realm which they jointly address. The non-triviality of incom-
mensurability requires that there is some range of phenomena that can
be considered relevant for both theories. This common ground is suffi-
cient for making empirical comparison possible. Consider a particular
experiment for which both theories claim responsibility. Each of them
captures the outcome by using its own observational vocabulary. As-
sume that the outcome is such that it is justified, on the basis of one
account, to conclude that a certain process, as specified in terms of this
account, has actually taken place, while it is illicit, on the basis of the
rivaling theory, to judge that the process required by this theory has
occurred. The experiment and its result are described within the con-
ceptual frameworks of each of the theories involved.
The series of experiments Walter Kaufmann conducted between 1901
and 1905 constitutes an example. Kaufmann’s experiments were in-
tended to measure the dependence of the mass of electrons upon their
velocity. Considered with hindsight, they were relevant for the rela-
tivistic dependence of mass on velocity — although they issued in the
erroneous refutation of this dependence [Hon 1995, 194-195], [Cushing
1998, 210-215].
Mass in Lorentz and mass in Einstein are incommensurable quanti-
ties (see section 5). Still, Kaufmann’s findings were taken to be relevant
for both classical electrodynamics and special relativity. The measure-
ment was performed by registering electron trajectories in electromag-
netic fields. The electron paths were detected using a photographic plate.
Kaufmann managed to obtain a visible curve on the plate whose precise
shape was supposed to indicate the sought-for quantity. This effect was
positively identified irrespective of the theoretical background. The re-
liability of the result was contentious, to be sure; actually, it was aban-
doned later. But this issue had nothing to do with the dissent as to the
overarching background principles. Lorentzians and Einsteinians had no
trouble identifying the traces left by incident electrons.
3The pages mentionned are the ones of the german edition.
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Another case in point is the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment of 1932
which constituted a refinement of the Michelson-Morley experiment and
was undertaken so as to compare Lorentz’s and Einstein’s theories em-
pirically. Lorentz’s account entailed a negative result of the Michelson-
Morley experiment only on the condition that the lengths of the inter-
ferometer arms were equal (when unaffected by the motion through the
ether). Only under such circumstances, the changes in the velocity of
light induced by the motion of the observer and the contraction of optical
apparatus canceled each other out precisely. Interferometers equipped
with unequal arms, by contrast, should exhibit a net effect. Electrody-
namic theory yields an equation that connects the ensuing shift in the
interference fringes with the difference in the lengths of the interferom-
eter arms (resting in the ether) and the velocity of the apparatus with
respect to the ether. The prediction was that if these two quantities
did not vanish, a shift should occur during the seasonal change in the
direction of the Earth’s motion. The reason is that however the Earth
moves precisely through the ether, it cannot be at rest all the time (see
section 4) [French 1968, section 3.1; 3.6].
The partisan of classical electrodynamics may feel free to determine
the relevant quantities in whichever way she prefers. The point is that
the circumstances can easily be arranged such that her theory entails
the appearance of fringe shifts. The only thing she has to acknowledge
is the unequality of the interferometer dimensions and the attribution
of a non-vanishing absolute velocity to the Earth. The realization of
the former condition can be left completely to her, the fulfillment of
the latter follows from her theory. By contrast, the adherent of special
relativity anticipates that no fringe shifts occur. From his point of view,
the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment is but a trivial modification of the
Michelson-Morley experiment so that the same null result can safely be
expected. As it turned out, the prediction of the latter was confirmed
and the expectation of the former disappointed.
The crucial aspect is that the success or failure of the empirical test
may be judged against the background of one’s own commitments and
standards. No need for translation arises. A theory may well be tested
by its own followers, and to them the relevant claims are by no means
obscure4. To be sure, it is necessary that a shared realm of relevant phe-
4Intersubjective control of theories containing incommensurable concepts is still
feasible. Kuhn rightly distinguishes between translation and language acquisition
[Kuhn 1983, 676-677]. It is a consequence of the context account that concepts can
be learned by familiarizing oneself with the pertinent theoretical context. One may
become bilingual — and yet be at a loss to translate. It follows that the empirical
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nomena is recognized. Advocates of each theory have to acknowledge re-
sponsibility for coping with these phenomena (which may be disparately
understood in either theory). But this much of a common ground is
secured by the mere fact that we are dealing with incommensurable the-
ories.
7. Theoretical Contrast and Partial Overlap of Natu-
ral Kinds
These considerations make the relations between incommensurable con-
cepts more perspicuous. The translation failure arising between incom-
mensurable concepts is of a particular sort. It is based on incompatibil-
ity rather than unrelatedness. Within the theoretical context account
of meaning two constraints guide translations: empirical indications and
theoretical integration have to coincide. Synonymous concepts need to
apply to the same observations or situations and need to be embed-
ded at the same time in nomological frameworks exhibiting the same
structure. Incommensurable concepts are distinguished by the fact that
there is some agreement on both counts. In order to qualify as prima-
facie analogues and candidates for translations, such concepts need to
be applicable to some shared domain and display some relatedness as
to theoretical integration. I underscored earlier that incommensurable
concepts do not satisfy both these demands. But the converse aspect de-
serves emphasis as well: incommensurable concepts exhibit a particular
type of relationship to one another; they are connected with one an-
other by empirical or theoretical ties. This sort of connectedness makes
translation failure due to incommensurability a distinctive notion.
Let me explore these connections a bit more thoroughly. Kuhn’s
notion of a partial overlap among the referents of incommensurable con-
cepts provides a basis for further clarification. This notion suggests that
incommensurable concepts need to share some domain of application, on
the one hand, but that this core domain is expanded in different ways
for each of the conceptual counterparts in question, on the other. This
means that incommensurable concepts do not denote precisely the same
states of affairs. There is a shared realm of application and there are
deviations. Take the Lorentz-Einstein example. Although the two theo-
ries accept the same measuring procedures for spatiotemporal and mass
relations, the predictions regarding these relations do not always agree.
comparison of theories with incommensurable concepts can be performed by a single
person [Carrier 2001, 85–86].
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Rather, as I argued before, differences in judgment about the prevailing
length relations obtain. It makes a difference, after all, whether the ex-
pected contraction relations are reciprocal or asymmetric (see sections
4-5).
The point is, then, that these divergent anticipations cannot be
brought into harmony because of an underlying theoretical dissent.
Lorentzian electrodynamics and Einsteinian special relativity disagree
over the appropriate natural kinds (see section 5). The accepted re-
lations of similarity diverge in both accounts, with the result that it
is impossible to define conceptual analogs of Lorentzian spatiotempo-
ral and mass terms in Einstein’s theory. It is a distinctive feature of
incommensurability that the relevant classificatory discrepancies resist
reciprocal adaptation because they arise from fundamental theoretical
divergence. Non-translatability due to incommensurability is not the
result of a simple conceptual gap. Incommensurability is not about an
accidentally missing word; it is rather about an in-principle rift. Un-
derlying incommensurability is a theoretical dissent which makes it im-
possible to conceive an ersatz concept that could play the empirical and
theoretical role of a term of the other theory in question. There is no
way to define a something akin to “absolute motion” or “total mass” in
special relativity short of running into a contradiction with the principles
of this theory. Consequently, not any old taxonomical disagreement is
sufficient for producing incommensurability. Rather, the relevant sort of
disagreement needs to be induced by theoretical contrast and resist easy
resolution.
Consider Kuhn’s own example of a shift in meaning and reference
of the concept “planet” as a result of the Copernican Revolution. Geo-
centrically speaking, “planet” means celestial body rotating around the
Earth. Mars, Sun and Moon equally qualify as planets in this sense while
the Earth does not. Heliocentrically speaking, “planet” means celestial
body revolving around the Sun. According to this changed understand-
ing, Earth and Mars pass as planets, while neither Sun nor Moon do.
These changes in meaning are intertwined with a shift in the taxonomy
of the relevant bodies. Geocentrically, Mars, Sun and Moon form part
of the same natural kind, whereas the Earth was placed in a different
category. After the revolution, Earth and Mars were equal in kind, while
Sun and Moon shifted in kind in becoming a star and a satellite, respec-
tively. The members of the geocentric kind “planet” were scattered into
distinct taxa and placed alongside entities which were formerly taken to
be of heterogeneous nature [Kuhn 1962, 115; 128-129], [Kuhn 1987, 8].
This example of Kuhn’s regarding incommensurable concepts illus-
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trates, first, that such concepts share a core domain of application. A
large number of geocentric planets are also heliocentric planets and vice
versa. Second, this core domain is expanded differently for the two con-
cepts. Geocentric planets include the Sun and the Moon, heliocentric
planets instead encompass the Earth. It follows that the two domains
of application overlap only partially. Third, this classificatory discrep-
ancy resists resolution because of the underlying theoretical contrast. It
is this contrast which makes it impossible to reciprocally assimilate the
two domains and to apply the concept indiscriminately to all entities in
question. This incompatibility between the theories involved lies at the
root of incommensurability.
8. Conclusion
There are three conclusions to be drawn from these considerations. First,
incommensurability is real. The notion can coherently be reconstructed
and positive instances of theories with incommensurable concepts can
be specified. Second, incommensurability does not pose a serious threat
to the objectivity of science or its commitment to experience. In order
to make their conception non-trivial, advocates of incommensurability
have to grant — in contrast to their declared intention — that empir-
ical comparison of theories with incommensurable concepts is possible.
Third, incommensurability is of lasting importance as a problem in the
philosophy of language. Incommensurability gives rise to the translation
problem associated with the context account of meaning. It constitutes
the successor problem to Quine’s indeterminacy of translation. Whereas
Quine’s claim was based on the verification theory of meaning, Kuhn’s
and Feyerabend’s views emerge within the context account. And whereas
Quine is prepared to accept a large number of distinct but equally ap-
propriate translations, Kuhn and Feyerabend suggest that there is not
a single adequate rendering. Thus, basis and substance of the two posi-
tions are fairly disparate. Incommensurability is the follow-up paradox
of translation which continues to haunt us after the demise of verifica-
tionism. Fourth, in one respect incommensurability continues to be of
epistemic significance. My argument does nothing to defuse the above-
mentioned worry that incommensurability contributes to undermining a
cumulative view of scientific progress according to which science man-
ages incessantly to pile up truths upon one another. The lesson incom-
mensurability teaches is that in the course of theory change, scientific
achievements may be conceptually reframed beyond recognition. In par-
ticular, the occurrence of reference shifts poses a serious threat to the
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claim that scientific theories accomplish an ever deeper understanding of
the same objects and processes. In this respect the incommensurability
thesis retains some epistemic significance after all.
